Renewed Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Gregg McCrary by Carr, George H. & Gilbert, Terry H.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
1995-2002 Court Filings 2000 Trial
3-3-2000
Renewed Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of
Gregg McCrary
George H. Carr
Counsel for Sheppard Estate
Terry H. Gilbert
Counsel for Sheppard Estate
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/
sheppard_court_filings_2000
This Davis v. State of Ohio, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Case No. CV96-312322 is brought to you for free and open access by the 2000 Trial at
EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1995-2002 Court Filings by an authorized administrator of
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carr, George H. and Gilbert, Terry H., "Renewed Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Gregg McCrary" (2000). 1995-2002 Court
Filings. 152.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/sheppard_court_filings_2000/152
--
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
CHARLES MURRAY, Administrator 
of the Estate of 
SAMUEL H. SHEPP ARD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
STATE OF OHIO 
Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Judge Ronald Suster 
Case No. 312322 
RENEWED MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF 
GREGG MCCRARY 
Plaintiff hereby moves this Court for an Order striking Gregg McCrary as a potential expert 
witness and to preclude the Defendant. State of Ohio, from offering any testimony from him. The 
reasons and authorities for granting this motion are set forth fully in the attached brief in support, 
which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
. Gilbert (0021948) 
George H. Carr (0069372) 
1700 Standard Building 
13 70 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, OH 44113 
(216) 241-1430 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
--
Brief In Support 
L Background 
In December, 1999, Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Gregg McCrary, a 
retired FBI investigator, as a proffered "expert" witness on behalf of the State. On January 13, 2000, 
this Court ruled that Plaintiffs motion was denied, pending an expert voir dire of Mr. Mc Crary. Due 
to the rulings of this Court thus far in the trial, Plaintiff now moves this Court to exclude the 
testimony of Mr. McCrary without reaching the expert voir dire, for the reasons stated below. 
IL Law and Argument 
There are three grounds for this motion, which will be addressed in consecutive order. 
A. Character Testimonv 
It is well settled that testimony by a "profiler" or crime scene analyst impermissibly places 
a person's character into issue, in \'iolation ofR.Evid. 404(A). In State v. Haynes ( 1988), Ninth Dist. 
App. No. 4310. unreporred, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3811, the Ninth District Court of Appeals 
reversed a criminal conviction because of the admission of the testimony of a "criminal profilist." 
In State v. Roquemore ( 1993), 85 Ohio App. 3d 448, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that 
the trial court's admission of a" crime scene assessment" constituted reversible error. In both cases, 
the testimony was held to have violated R.Evid. 404(A)(l) by admitting evidence of character. 
Additionally, in Roquemore, the trial court \Vas reversed for improperly applying the R.Evid. 403 
balancing test and allowing testimony vvhose prejudicial tendencies outweighed its probative value. 
id at 455-456. Finally. testimony regarding "crime scene analysis" unreasonably invades the 
province of the jury in making ultimate determinations of fact, and is therefore inadmissible. id. at 
454, citing State v. Koss (1990). 49 Ohio St. 3d 213. 216, 551N.E.2d970, 972-974. 
2 
These cases directly apply to the instant case, and should prohibit the State from offering the 
testimony of Mr. McCrary, as violating R.Evid. 403, 404, and 702. Mr. McCrary's "expert" report 
explains that his "crime scene assessment" leads him to conclude that Dr. Sam Sheppard must have 
committed the crime. This falls squarely within the type of testimony prohibited in Roquemore and 
Haynes. and is impermissible. 
B. Credentials and Qualifications 
The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that scientific or technical evidence is "subject to a 
judicial analysis for prejudice" under Ohio R.Evid. 403, State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St. 3d 490, 497. 597 
N.E.2d l 07, 112 (1992). In determining the admissibility of purported "expert" testimony. a trial 
court must examine the methods used by a proffered expert witness in reaching any conclusions, and 
- the conclusions themselves, in balancing "the probativeness. materiality, and reliability of the 
evidence against the risk of misleading or confusing the jury or unfairly prejudicing the [adverse 
party]." Id at 496. 597 N.E.2d at 112. quoting CASE NOTE. U.V!TED STATES V. Two Beus: EIGHTH 
CIRCUIT ADDRESSES ADMISSIBILITY OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1991), 37 Loyola L.Rev. 173, 
177. 
-
This approach reqmres a trial court to critically examine a proffered expert witness 
credentials and the methodology underlying the opinions reached by the witness, in order to prevent 
the jury from being misled or confused by expert testimony. Here, the State's proffered expert 
witness does not haw adequate credentials to render opinion testimony regarding the issues in his 
report, and the conclusions in his report are unreliable. 
Ohio R.Evid. 702(8) requires that a witness be "qualified as an expert by specialized 
knowledge, skill. experience, training. or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony." 
Here, Mr. Mc Crary" s professional qualifications are inadequate. Mr. McCrary obtained a Bachelor 
3 
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of Fine Arts degree in an area unrelated to his testimony, 1 and a Master of Arts in 11 Psychological 
Services, 11 which does not allow him to practice psychology or psychiatry in any way. 2 Mr. Mc Crary 
has never handled a domestic homicide investigation,3 has not had any formal training in the area 
of domestic homicides,4 has published only one article, in an area unrelated to this case,5 and has 
done no published research work. 6 Mr. McCrary has no accredited degree in criminology,7 and has 
never testified to a jury regarding the results of any of his crime scene analyses. 8 
Mr. McCrary renders opinions in at least three recognized scientific fields. Criminology is 
a social science that deals with the collection and interpretation of crime-related statistics. 
Criminalistics is a field of forensic science dealing vvith the analysis of physical evidence relating 
to crime. Victimology is a sociological specialty dealing with statistical analysis of crime patterns 
and the likely victims of various crimes. 
However, Mr. McCrary possesses no "specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education" in any of these fields. Nothing in his background reveals any training in these fields, and 
he does not state that he has ever testified as an expert witness in any of these fields. 
In reality, Mr. McCrary's expertise seems to be in the novel scientific field of 11behavioral 
criminology." No reference is made to any training in this area, or even to any standard treatises or 
1See Mccrary deposition at 10. 
'See McCrary deposition at 1 l -13. 
'See McCrary deposition at 19. 
•see McCrary deposition at 29-30. 
'See McCrary deposition at 29-30. 
6See McCrary deposition at 33-34. 
7See McCrary deposition at 36. 
8See McCrary deposition at 27-28. 
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commonly accepted theories central to this field. Therefore, pursuant to this court's duty to exclude 
testimony of purported experts which could prove misleading or confusing to the jury. Mr. Mc Crary 
should be prevented from testifying, as he does not possess adequate credentials or proof of 
"specialized knowledge. skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the 
testimony," as required by Ohio R.Evid. 702(B). 
C. Reliabilitv of Methods and Conclusions 
Mr. McCrary's testimony should also be excluded because of his failure to satisfy the 
requirements of Ohio R.Evid. 702(C) that testimony be "based on reliable scientific. technical, or 
other specialized information." 
In evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence. several factors are to be considered: 
( 1) whether the theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected 
to peer review. (3) whether there is a known potential rate of error. and ( 4) whether 
the methodology has gained general acceptance. Although these factors may aid in 
determining reliability. the inquiry is flexible. The focus is "solely on principles and 
methodology. not on the conclusions that they generate." 
Miller v. Bike Athletic Co .. 80 Ohio St. 3d 607. 611-612, 687 N.E.2d 735, 740 ( 1998), quoting 
Dauberr v. i\lferrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (citations omitted). 
Nothing in Mr. McCrary's report can satisfy this standard of scientific reliability. His 
theories are not peer reviewed or published to a general community of "behavioral criminologists;" 
in fact, his curriculum vitae does not reveal a single published article or theory. Although "while 
peer review may be helpful. is it not absolutely necessary for an opinion to be admissible," Miller, 
supra, at 613, 687 N .E.2d at 7 41, the lack of peer review should be considered by this Court as 
weighing heavily against reliability. Similarly, \vithout publication or peer review.'1 an error rate 
'
1Mr. McCrary is unaware of any empirical or statistical studies regarding staged domestic 
homicide. See McCrary deposition at 48-49. 
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cannot be derived. and tests cannot be conducted. Thus. Mr. McCrary's testimony is not "scientific" 
for purposes of Ohio R.Evid. 702(C). 10 
Therefore, Mr. McCrary' s testimony must be considered "technical or other specialized 
information" under Ohio R.Evid. 702(C). Even this non-scientific testimony must be scrutinized for 
reliability prior to its admissibility. State v. Stowers, 81 Ohio St. 3d 260, 262, 690 N.E.2d 881, 883 
( 1998). Only "[r ]elevant evidence based on valid principles will satisfy the threshold reliability 
standard for the admission of expert testimony." State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St. 3d 202, 21 L 694 
N.E.2d 1332. 1339 ( 1998). Therefore, this court must prevent the admission of any testimony not 
satisfying this fundamental requirement. 
Key questions for resolution by the trial court include: whether the reasoning or 
methodology can be or has been tested: whether the theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication: considerations of the known or potential 
rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique's operation: and, finally. considerations of whether the methods or 
techniques have gained "general acceptance" should be considered. 
State v. Clark, l 01 Ohio App. 3d 389.-+ 15. 655 >J.E.2d 795 (1995). 
Mr. Mc Crary· s testimony is exactly the sort of purported expert testimony this threshold 
admissibility requirement was designed to prevent. He admits that he is not licensed or formally 
trained in sociology . 11 and concedes that he made up the name for his agency. "behavioral 
criminology." without reference to any recognized field. 12 and that his field of expertise, "crime 
scene criminal investioative analvsis." is not a recognized forensic science. 13 Mr. McCrary further e . ~ 
1\)To his credit. Mr. McCrary admitted. when cross-examined on his statements to the media, that 
suspect profiling is "far from a hard science and the purpose is to screen potential suspects." McCrary 
deposition at -+4. 
11 See McCrary deposition at 37. 
1
=see McCrary deposition at 35. 
13See McCrary deposition at 37. 
6 
admits that it is not unusual in his field for two similarly trained and experienced people to come up 
with very different opinions, and that his field is not an exact science. 14 
Without reference to any "valid principles" from which he draws his conclusions, Mr. 
McCrary opines that various elements of Dr. Sam Sheppard's alibi are inconsistent, and that various 
elements of the crime scene are inconsistent with various other theories of how the murder of Mrs. 
Sheppard was perpetrated, and are instead consistent with a "staged domestic homicide." 
Mr. McCrary does not reach these conclusions through any recognized field of science. 
Criminology and victimology are statistical sciences, based on the statistical likelihoods of criminal 
activity within a given population. These sciences are only investigative tools. because no statistical 
analysis can be applied to a population sample of one: in other words, statistical analysis can be 
- relevant in determining the most likely perpetrator of a crime during an investigation, but cannot be 
scientifically applied to determining the actual facts in an individual murder. 
-
Mr. McCrary' s theories and conclusions have not been tested: he has not published them. or 
subjected them to any other method of peer review; his technique cannot be quantified into any 
meaningful calculation of errors or false positives: and his field, "behavioral criminology," is not 
generally recognized by the appropriate community. Thus, Mr. McCrary's testimony is not 
"reliable," as "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" that would be helpful to the trier 
of fact. 
111 Conclusion 
Mr. McCrary should not be permitted to testify for the State, on three grounds. First, his 
testimony is substantively inadmissible. based on its violation ofR.Evid. 403. 404. and 702. Second. 
1
,See Mccrary deposition at 57. 
7 
-his lack of qualifications prevent him from giving the testimony under R.Evid. 702(8). Finally, the 
conclusions he reaches are not "reliable" within the meaning of Ohio R.Evid. 702(C). Therefore, 
this Court should enter an order in limine preventing his testimony at trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.c-.-____---
--4'----t.~'=-~~-1-~~~ 
Te~_j]ilbert (00 948) 
CxeergeH. Carr (0069372) 
1700 Standard Building 
1370 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, OH 44113 
(216) 241-1430 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Renewed Motion in limine to Exclude Expert 
Testimony of Gregg McCrary has been served on William Mason, Prosecuting Attorney, Justice 
31-J 
Center, 9th Floor, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 on this_ day of March, 2000. 
~~~~, 
~~ H. Carr (0069372) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
9 
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6TH CASE of Focus printed in FULL format. 
STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. RICHARD HAYNES, Defendant-Appellant 
C.A. No. 4310 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Appellate District, Lorain County PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
'I3 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3811 
September 21, 1988, Decided 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
[*1] 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE 
COMMON PLEAS COURT, COUNTY OF LORAIN, 
OHIO, CASE NO. 33966 
DISPOSITION: Based upon our disposition of the first 
assignment of error, Haynes' conviction is hereby re-
versed and the cause remanded for a new trial. 
COUNSEL: GREGORY A. WHITE, Prosecuting 
Attorney, Elyria, OH for Plaintiff. 
JOSEPH C. GRUNDA, Attorney at Law, Lorain, OH 
for Defendant. 
OPINIONBY: CACIOPPO 
OPINION: DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. 
Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following 
disposition is made: 
CACIOPPO, J. 
Defendant-appellant, Richard Haynes, appeals his 
conviction for the murder of Douglas Fauver. The facts 
surrounding Fauver's death, according to Haynes, are 
as follows. Haynes claimed that at approximately 6:30 
p.m. on the evening of October 20, 1986, he went to 
Fauver's apartment to fill out a job application Haynes 
accepted several drinks from Fauver and also took some 
pills which Fauver claimed to have been speed. 
Haynes' next recollection is waking up at approxi-
mately 11 :30 p.m. to discover Fauver, naked, sitting 
across from him. Fauver then told Haynes he had per-
formed an act of fellatio upon him and asked him how 
he liked it. Haynes went [*2] to the bathroom to wash 
up, and used the shower to run cold water on his head 
to clear his mind, claiming he was still groggy from the 
drugs. He went into Fauver's bedroom, got a pair of 
LEXIS·· NEXIS. 
pants, threw them at Fauver and told him to put them 
on. Haynes then began tearing up Fauver's bedroom 
looking for his address book that was missing and the 
application he had filled out. 
As Haynes was coming out of the bedroom, Fauver 
came at him with a small paring knife. The two men 
started fighting in the area between the kitchen and bed-
room. Fauver cut Haynes wrist with the knife, and 
Haynes then grabbed Fauver in a headlock and stabbed 
him twice in the chest. Fauver fell backwards, but 
then stood up and started walking toward the bedroom. 
Haynes grabbed a large knife off the kitchen back. nl 
Haynes then sat in a chair for approximately two hours 
waiting for the police to arrive since there had been so 
much noise during the struggle. When the police did not 
arrive, Haynes left the apartment. Fauver' s body was 
discovered the next day. 
nl The autopsy report revealed that Fauver had 
been stabbed nine times; the cause of death was as-
piration of blood caused by a stab wound in the chest. 
Thereafter, [*3] Haynes stole a car and drove to 
Florida. After several days, he went to Tennessee, 
California, and finally stopped in Arizona. In Arizona, 
Haynes was arrested on an unrelated charge. Detective 
Medders of the Elyria Police Department went there to 
pick him up. 
In an interview at the Arizona jail, Haynes related the 
preceding story to Detective Medders. State's Exhibit 
3. Haynes had also made statements to the Arizona au-
thorities, and left a written version of his story (State's 
Exhibit 5) in his cell. 
Haynes was indicted and charged with murder, in vio-
lation of R. C. 2903. 02 (A), and one count of grand theft 
of a motor vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(l). 
Upon notice that the state intended to introduce the tes-
timony of Robert Walter, an expert in criminal profiles, 
defense counsel filed a motion in limine. After a hear-
ing, the trial court provisionally denied the motion sub-
ject to voir dire of the expert prior to his testimony. At 
LEXIS·· NEXIS® 
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FOCUS 
the trial, voir dire of the expert was conducted and the 
trial court decided to admit the testimony. n2 
n2 Defense counsel entered a continuing objection 
to the expert's testimony. 
The jury was instructed on the law with respect to [*4] 
murder, voluntary manslaughter, self-defense, and the 
influence of intoxication, drugs, and/or anger. Haynes 
was found guilty on both counts of the indictment and 
sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life for the mur-
der and a consecutive term of two years for the theft. 
Haynes now appeals. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 
"The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant when 
it permitted the testimony of a criminal profilist where 
neither the scientific reliability nor the general accep-
tance of the theories proposed by the profilist had been 
established, and the prejudicial effect of the testimony 
far outweighed its probative value." 
This assignment of error concerns the admission of 
the testimony of Robert Walter as an expert in criminal 
profiling. Walter testified as to the distinction between 
a homophobic murder and an anger-retaliatory murder. 
The state argues that this testimony shows that, based on 
the timing of the events, along with other factors, the 
crime did not occur according to the state's perception 
of what Haynes claimed, i.e., that it was not a homo-
phobic murder done out of panic after an unsolicited 
homosexual encounter, but rather an anger-retaliatory 
killing [*5] committed purposely after a cooling off pe-
riod. Haynes makes several arguments as to why the 
testimony should have been excluded, including the ar-
gument that he never actually claimed he killed Fauver 
out of panic resulting from the homosexual encounter; 
that he was, instead, claiming self-defense from a knife 
attack. Haynes argues that the state set up the theory of 
homophobic murder as a strawman argument and then 
set out to attack it. The record supports this assessment 
and several other of the appellant's arguments. 
The admission of this testimony is troubling for many 
reasons. Using an analysis based on the rules of ev-
idence, we will address the reasons for exclusion pro-
pounded by the appellant, as well as several other reasons 
for exclusion of this testimony. 
Evid. R. 401 provides: 
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Walter's testimony appears to be facially relevant as it 
may be considered to show that it was more probable 
that Haynes purposely killed Fauver. 
Evid. R. 402 provides: 
"All [*6] relevant evidence is admissible, except as oth-
erwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, 
by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by statute en-
acted by the General Assembly not in conflict with a 
rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio, by these rules, or by 
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." (em-
phasis added). 
It is at this point in the evidentiary analysis that our 
concern arises. Our review of the record leads us to 
find that admission of Halter's testimony conflicts with 
several evidentiary rules. 
Evid. R. 702 provides: 
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise." 
Haynes argues that the state failed to establish that the 
expert's theory was either generally accepted n3 or sci-
entifically reliable, and that the trial court therefore had 
no basis upon which to make this important threshold 
determination. The state asserts that, by his argument, 
[*7] Haynes "overlooked that technical or specialized 
knowledge that will assist the trier or tact to understand 
the evidence or determine a fact in issue may be used 
if the witness has expert knowledge ***." Appellee's 
brief at 5. The state has overlooked the principle that 
unless scientific evidence and/or theory can be consid-
ered reliable, it cannot be of assistance to the trier of 
fact. 
n3 We note that appellant refers to proof of "gen-
eral acceptance" of scientific evidence as a prerequi-
site to admissibility. This standard was established 
inFryev. United States (1923), 293F.1013, andhas 
been the subject of constant debate by both the courts 
and commentators. The Supreme Court of Ohio has 
rejected the "Frye test" in favor of a more flexible 
standard of admissibility derived from the Rules of 
Evidence. See State v. Williams (1983), 4 Ohio St. 
3d 53. Therefore, we will analyze the evidence in 
this case in accordance with the rules. 
LEXIS·· NEXIS. LEXIS·· NEXIS. LEXIS·· NEXIS. 
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During the voir dire examination of the expert, the 
state concentrated primarily on Walter's qualifications as 
a criminal profiler rather than the reliability of the un-
derlying theory of criminal profiling. Although Walter 
[*8] stated that criminal profiling can be used in many 
different ways, he only explained its use for investiga-
tory purposes: 
"Q. What exactly do you mean by criminal profiling, 
sir? 
"A. Criminal profiling can be used in many different 
ways. 
"One of the ways in which it's often used is when a 
suspect is unknown in a crime, then one analyzes not 
only the act, the criminal act itself, then one evaluates 
the crime scene evidence which surrounds that, then one 
evaluates and reviews all Police Reports, and gets an in-
dication, based upon probability, based upon experience, 
based upon consistency with patterns that are developed 
within crimes, that, then, one can look forward and offer 
a profile for the police to apprehend the suspect. " 
"*** " 
T. at 83. 
"*** The purpose of the profile is to shape the inves-
tigation predicated upon the crime scene evidence and 
the available evidence independent of who the specific 
perpetrator is. 
"One is interested in what is presented, what the crim-
inal act was, how that relates, and what kind of profile 
that forms which helps the Police in terms of looking 
for a suspect.***." 
T. at 92. 
Although Walter is a licensed psychologist, his testi-
mony was [*9] not related to psychology, but to the field 
of criminal profiling. T. at 134-135. Walter testified 
that he had performed profiling services for investiga-
tory purposes for police departments in several states, 
for the British and Australian governments, and for var-
ious agencies; he also stated that the FBI uses profiles. 
T. at 82-84. 
Although this testimony may indicate that profiles may 
be a reliable investigative tool, there is little indication in 
the record that they can be said to be reliable for the pur-
poses for which they were used by the state in the instant 
case. Walter stated that he had testified in three other 
murder trials, including People v. Drake (1987), 129 
App. Div. 2d963, 514N.Y.S. 2d280. n4 Walter's testi-
mony in Drake, however, is distinguishable from that in 
the instant case, in that the defendant there maintained 
that he had accidentally killed two occupants of a car 
when he fired several rounds of ammunition into what 
he believed was an abandoned car. The victims' bodies 
displayed stab wounds, bullet wounds, bite marks, and 
anal bruises. Walter concluded that the circumstances 
of the case indicated a pathological condition known as 
piquerism, [* 10] where the perpetrator realizes sexual 
satisfaction from penetrating a victim by sniper fire, or 
by stab or bite wounds. Drake, supra, 514 N.Y.S. 2d, 
at 281. Walter's testimony in the instant case did not 
concern a pathological condition, nor did it concern the 
specific profile of piquerism. Conceivably, a problem 
may also exist in that one type of profile may not be as 
reliably identifiable as another. 
n4 Walters did not specifically state the names or 
details of the other two cases in which he had testi-
fied. 
The relevancy/admissibility analysis of novel scien-
tific evidence also requires that the expert's testimony 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or de-
termine a fact in issue. If the subject of the testimony is 
within the understanding of the jury, it is inadmissible. 
See State v. Thomas (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, at 
521. It also appears that the main point made by ex-
pert testimony in the instant case was well within the 
understanding of the average juror, as demonstrated by 
the following colloquy on direct examination: 
"*** 
"Q. So, basically, your testimony, then, as a criminal 
profiler is that there are certain fact patterns that are ex-
hibited [* 11] in a homophobic murder and certain fact 
patterns that are exhibited in an anger-retaliatory type 
murder? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. You're indicating that your review of this case in-
dicates this murder was not committed as the result of 
a panic that ensued after an unwanted homosexual en-
counter? 
"A. Correct. 
"Q. The real key to that is the timing? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. This death did not occur immediately after the 
LEXIS·· NEXIS. LEXIS·· NEXIS~ LEXIS·· NEXIS" 
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Defendant's finding out about the undesirable and horrid 
sexual encounter he says he had? 
"A. Right." 
"*** II 
T. at 118-119. 
The issues of timing and sudden panic are directly re-
lated to the distinction between voluntary manslaugh-
ter and murder. From the defendant's confession, a 
jury could decide for themselves that he did not kill 
Fauver immediately after discovering that he had been 
assaulted, but that a period of time had elapsed in which 
he could have "cooled off". The use of expert testimony 
for this purpose was improper; the prejudicial impact 
outweighed probative value, as it tended to "sensation-
alize" the facts and issues. 
The testimony as to timing and panic embraced the 
ultimate issue of intent to be decided by the jury. See 
Evid. R. 704. Under Evid. R. 704, "[o]pinion [*12] 
testimony on an ultimate issue is admissible if it assists 
the trier of the fact, otherwise it is not admissible. The 
competency of the trier of the fact to resolve the factual 
issue determines whether or not the opinion testimony 
is of assistance." Staff Note to Evid. R. 704. For this 
reason, an ultimate issue opinion by an expert should be 
excluded in extreme cases where that opinion is inher-
ently misleading or unduly prejudicial. Weissenberger' s 
Ohio Evidence (1982), Section 704.3. 
This leads us to discuss the problems this case presents 
with respect to Evid. R. 403, which provides: 
"(A) Exclusion Mandatory. Although relevant, evidence 
is not admissible if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confu-
sion of the issues, or of misleading the jury." 
The introduction of Walter's testimony can also be 
considered to have confused the issues and/or misled 
the jury, by setting up the strawman argument discussed 
previously. 
Further, Walter testified that criminal profiles iden-
tify types of perpetrators. In Thomas, supra, at 521, 
the Supreme Court rejected admissibility of testimony 
on the battered woman syndrome, partly out of a [*13] 
belief that such testimony would tend to stereotype a 
defendant, causing the jury to become prejudiced. The 
court believed there was a danger that the jury "could 
decide the facts based on typical, and not the actual, 
facts." Id. at 521. 
In the instant case, Walter testified that the appellant's 
LEXIS"· NEXIS. 
version of the killing and his subsequent actions were 
classically typical of an anger-retaliatory murder. In 
fact, Walter testified at great length and in great de-
tail as to the traits and characteristics of such a type 
of murderer, and found that the appellant's actions and 
motivations matched that profile. 
The possibility of stereotyping also brings up the pos-
sibility that admission of the expert testimony violated 
Evid. R. 404(A)(l): 
"(A) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a per-
son's character or a trait of his character is not admis-
sible for the purpose of proving that he acted in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, subject to the 
following exceptions: 
"(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait 
of his character offered by an accused, or by the pros-
ecution to rebut the same is admissible; however, in 
prosecutions for rape, gross sexual imposition, [*14] 
and prostitution, the exceptions provided by statute en-
acted by the General Assembly are applicable." 
"*** It 
Courts in other states, in considering the admissibil-
ity of the battering parent profile, have treated the pro-
file as evidence of the defendant's character; that is, to 
show that the defendant matches the profile and there-
fore is more likely to have committed the particular abuse 
charged. Gianelli & Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 
( 1986) 302, Section 9-7. 
"*** Generally, character evidence is inadmissible un-
less the defendant first introduces evidence of his own 
good character. Since the defendants in these cases had 
not introduced character evidence, the courts have ex-
cluded expert testimony concerning the battering parent 
profile." 
"*** " 
Id. 
In Sanders v. State (1983), 251 Ga. 70, at 76, 303 
S.E. 2d 13, at 18, the court stated: 
"***[U]nless a defendant has placed her character in is-
sue or has raised some defense which the battering parent 
syndrome is relevant to rebut, the state may not intro-
duce evidence of the syndrome, nor may the state intro-
duce character evidence showing a defendant's person-
ality traits and personal history as its foundation [*15] 
for demonstrating the defendant has the characteristics 
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of a typical battering parent. ***." 
See, also, State v. Durfee (Minn. 1982), 322 N. W. 2d 
778, 785; State v. Loebach (Minn. 1981), 310 N. W. 2d 
58,, 64; "Annotation (1986), 43 A.L.R. 4th 1203. 
In the instant case, Haynes will not testify, and 
therefore did not place his character in issue. "It is 
Universally the rule that the prosecution, as part of 
its 'case in chief, may not offer evidence of the ac-
cused's character in order to show his propensity to 
perform the acts underlying the crime that is charged." 
Weissenberger, supra, Section 4045. 
Walter's testimony on the anger-retaliatory profile was 
laden with references to personality and character traits 
of the accused that matched the profile of a deliberate 
killer. The testimony, therefore, can be considered in-
admissible solely on the basis of Evid. R. 404(A)(l). 
The last rule which Haynes claims was violated is 
Evid. R. 703: 
"The facts or data in the particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those per-
ceived by him or admitted in evidence at the hearing." 
The Ohio rule differs markedly from Fed. R. Evid. 
703 in that the [* 16] federal rule also allows the expert 
to base his opinion on information made known to him 
at or before the hearing. "If of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opin-
ions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need 
not be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 703. 
Walters testified on cross-examination that he based his 
opinion on police reports, the autopsy report, and con-
versations with the prosecutor and the police. Only the 
autopsy report was admitted into evidence. "Pursuant 
to Evid. R. 703, an expert may not base his opinion 
on hearsay but must rely upon his own personal knowl-
edge of facts and data submitted as evidence in the case." 
Dellagnese v. Sorkin (Mar. 30, 1988), Summit App. 
Nos. 13036/13229, unreported, at 3 (citing State v. 
Jones (1984), 9 Ohio St. 3d 123 and Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co. v. BPS (1985), 23 Ohio App. 3d 56). See, 
also, Midwest Specialties, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. (July 20, 1588), Summit App. No. 13349, 
unreported) The conversations [a]fter had with the police 
and the prosecutor are clearly hearsay. 
Admission of expert opinion testimony based in part 
on medical reports [*17] and medical histories not ad-
mitted in evidence and not prepared by the witness has 
been held to be prejudicial error. See State v. Jones, 
supra; Kraner v. Coastal Tank Lines (1971), 26 Ohio 
St. 2d 59. This holding would apply to police reports 
as well. 
Admission of the expert testimony can be considered 
error for any or all of the foregoing reasons We must 
now decide whether the error was prejudicial or harm-
less. "The question is whether there is a reasonable pos-
sibility that the evidence complained of might have con-
tributed to the conviction." Fahy v. Connecticut (1963), 
375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (followed in Chapman v. California 
(1967), 386 U.S. 18, 23). See, also, State v. Thompson 
(1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 496, 499; State v. Lytle (1976), 
48 Ohio St. 2d 391. 
Upon review of the record, putting aside the expert 
testimony, we do not find the independent evidence of 
Haynes guilt as to murder to be overwhelming. The re-
maining evidence consisted of the testimony of Donald 
Thompson, an acquaintance of Haynes. Thompson tes-
tified that he had known Haynes for about two or three 
months, and had seen Haynes in a bar within a few 
days of the killing. [*18] Thompson stated that Haynes 
admitted to killing Fauver; that Haynes had gone to 
Fauver's apartment to fill out a job application, and 
Fauver had put his hand on Haynes' leg - a scuffle ensued 
and the stabbing occurred Haynes told Thompson that 
he killed Fauver because Fauver was gay and Haynes 
hated gays. T. at 68. Haynes explained the cut on his 
wrist as the result of a bar fight. 
Thompson stated that a few days after this meeting, 
Haynes gave him a switchblade in exchange for a ring. 
(Haynes had confessed to the police that he had taken a 
switchblade from Fauver's apartment) Thompson testi-
fied that he did not report Haynes' story to the police 
because he did not believe Haynes. 
Further, although Fauver had been stabbed in the back, 
the autopsy report states that his death was caused by a 
stab wound to the chest. 
The foregoing not constituting overwhelming inde-
pendent evidence of guilt, there exists a reasonable pos-
sibility that the admission of Walter's expert testimony 
contributed to the appellant's conviction, and therefore 
the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Haynes' first assignment of error is well taken. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 
"The trial court erred [* 19] to the prejudice of appellant 
when it excluded the contents of a briefcase found in the 
apartment of the deceased." 
Appellant sought to introduce into evidence a suit-
case full of pornographic materials, found in the vic-
tim's apartment, to show that the victim "had sexual 
proclivities beyond the mainstream". Appellant's brief 
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at 18. Haynes asserts that this characteristic was rele-
vant to his claim of being sexually assaulted and would 
bolster the credibility of his story. The trial court ex-
cluded the evidence finding it not relevant to the issue 
of whether the victim would be more likely to commit a 
rape or a knifing, and further stated that even if it was 
relevant, the probative value would be overwhelmed by 
the prejudicial deductions that could be made from the 
material. 
Evid. R. 404(A)(2) provides: 
"(A) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a per-
son's character or a trait of his character is not admis-
sible for the purpose of proving that he acted in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, subject to the 
following exceptions: 
"*** 
"Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused 
*** It 
The inference [*20] that possession of pornographic 
material indicates any specific kind of character trait, 
and that such a trait would tend to make it more proba-
ble than not that Fauver raped Haynes or attacked him 
with a knife seems tenuous at best. 
Assuming arguendo that this evidence is even remotely 
relevant, its admissibility must still be balanced under 
Evid. R. 403. Absent a showing of abuse of discre-
tion in applying Evid. R. 403, the trial court's ruling 
will not be disturbed. See Prickett v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co. (Sept. 18, 1985), Summit App. No. 
12008, unreported. Abuse of discretion connotes more 
than an error of law or judgment; it implies an unrea-
sonable, arbitrary or unconscionable attitude on the part 
of the court." Pembaur v Leis (1982), 1 Ohio St. 3d 89, 
91. Exclusion of this evidence does not meet this test. 
Haynes' second assignment of error is not well taken. 
Based upon our disposition of the first assignment of 
error, Haynes' conviction is hereby reversed and the 
cause remanded for a new trial. 
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds 
for this appeal. 
We order that a special mandate issue out of this court, 
directing the County of Lorain Common [*21] pleas 
Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified 
copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, 
pursuant to App. R. 27. 
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document 
shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it 
shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
at which time the period for review shall begin to run. 
App. R. 22(E). 
Costs taxed to appellee. 
Exceptions. 
CONCURB~MAHONEY 
CONCUR: MAHONEY, J. CONCURS SAYING: 
I concur in the majority opinion. 
My colleague's dissent has suggested that this case 
should be remanded with instructions to grant a new 
trial only if the state will not agree to accept a voluntary 
manslaughter conviction. I must concur that the facts of 
this case could easily be interpreted to lend themselves to 
such a solution. However, I know of no authority under 
which we could lawfully grant the defendant-appellant 
what could be characterized as an "additur" and force 
the state to elect to accept the "additur" or go to trial 
again. 
Next, the defendant has a guaranteed constitutional 
right not to testify. Neither we nor a jury should draw 
any inferences from his exercise of that right, nor should 
it give the prosecutor any special [*22] license to use 
conjectural opinion testimony predicated on inadmissi-
ble hearsay facts. 
In my opinion, the profilist's testimony was clearly 
inadmissible and the defense took a specific continuing 
objection to all of it. The opinion testimony of the pro-
filist was obviously offered by the state to zealously take 
what appeared to be a self-defense or manslaughter ori-
ented defense and, through the creative genius of the 
profilist, convince the jury it was murder with the aid 
of a factual portrait that was improperly in evidence. 
The evidence was extremely prejudicial. How can 
we reasonably say that the profilist's testimony did not 
influence the vote of at least one person on that jury? 
While zeal in the prosecution of criminal cases is to 
be admired, the prosecution must accept the facts as it 
finds them and not let its zeal become machiavellian. 
A jury should be allowed to weigh the evidence in this 
case free of a conjectural portrait by a criminal profilist 
and decide whether this defendant is guilty of murder or 
manslaughter, or that it was self-defense. 
DISSENTBY: QUILLIN 
DISSENT: QUILLIN, J. DISSENTS SAYING: 
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On October 21, 1986, Doug Fauver was found dead 
in his apartment. He had been stabbed eight [*23) times 
in the chest and neck. In his back a butcher knife was 
buried up to its hilt. 
Defendant-appellant Richard Haynes was charged 
with murder and auto theft based primarily on various 
statements he had made. In all the statements, Haynes 
admitted purposely killing Fauver. The statements did, 
however, include differing exculpatory assertions. 
Haynes did not testify. His defense was presented 
through the exculpatory portions of his statements ob-
tained after he had fled and was finally captured several 
months later. The prosecution was thus placed in the 
awkward position of having to discredit the exculpatory 
portions of Haynes' statements without the opportunity 
to cross-examine Haynes himself. 
A Donald Thompson testified that on Halloween 
Friday in October of 1986 defendant admitted the 
killing. Haynes told Thompson that he hated "fags" 
and, when the guy (Fauver) put his hand on Haynes leg, 
they began to struggle and that is when Haynes stabbed 
him. Haynes did not say anything about being raped. 
Haynes also said his wrist was cut in an unrelated bar 
fight. 
Even accepting the most favorable confession of 
Haynes, self defense was not established and the jury so 
found. Therefore, even [*24] if the majority is correct 
in saying that the testimony of the psychologist preju-
dicially exceeded proper limits, the case should be re-
manded with instructions to grant a new trial only if the 
state will not agree to accept a voluntary manslaughter 
conviction. 
However, I don't believe the trial judge erred in ac-
cepting a guilty verdict on the murder charge. 
In the exculpatory portion of his confession, Haynes 
claims that when he awakened, he was told that Fauver 
LEXIS·· NEXIS. 
had performed fellatio upon him. Did he react with sud-
den rage? No. He walks into the bathroom and puts his 
head under a cold shower. Haynes later begins to tear up 
the room. When Fauver, with a knife, attempts to stop 
him, a struggle ensues. Haynes takes away the knife, 
stabs Fauver eight times and, as Fauver attempts to flee, 
pursues him and stabs him in the back with a second 
knife. 
It is conceded by all that this was a purposeful killing. 
The defense claims that the purposeful killing (murder) 
is mitigated to voluntary manslaughter. To do so, the 
purposeful killing must be done under the influence of 
sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage brought on by 
serious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite [*25] 
the use of deadly force. 
I will concede that under the influence of sudden pas-
sion or sudden fit of rage is a concept that the average 
juror is capable of understanding and applying. There 
is no necessity that this be explained by an expert. al-
though there is no such necessity, it does not follow that 
expert testimony is always erroneous. It can be proper 
if it will assist the trier of the fact. 
I will also concede that the psychologist's testimony 
exceeded, in part, proper bounds. There was, however, 
only a general objection to his testimony. It is unreason-
able to expect a trial judge without a specific objection, 
to interrupt a witness. There is no claim of plain error. 
The prime defense was that this was merely volun-
tary manslaughter with a dash of self defense thrown 
in. These defenses are inconsistent. If the defendant 
had testified, it would have been impossible to sell both 
defenses to a jury. Although it was easier to argue this 
blended defense when the defendant did not testify, the 
facts in this case can support neither one. The jury and 
the trial judge had no difficulty seeing through the trans-
parent defense. Neither should we. 
I would affirm the conviction. 
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1 A. I decided it was time to captain my own ship. I 
2 had spent my life working for other people and decided 
3 that if I was ever going to work for myself, now would 
4 be the time to do that. 
5 Q. Let me go over your educational background. You 
6 have a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree at Ithaca College? 
7 A. Yes, sir. 
8 Q. 
9 A. 
What field was that? 
That was actually a triplum major. I had 
10 history, English and music. It was a Fine Arts degree. 
11 I got that from Ithaca College in 1967. 
12 Q. 
13 A. 
What did you do after you graduated in 1967? 
I taught high school and coached the wrestling 
14 team for a couple of years while I was trying to figure 
15 out what I wanted to do with my life. 
16 Q. Your undergraduate degree involved no academic 
17 area involving criminology, law enforcement, psychology 
18 or anything like that? 
19 A. There was some psych. courses in there, but no 
20 undergraduate degree. 
21 Q. 
22 A. 
Do you have any postundergraduate degrees? 
No. 
23 Q. On your resume you did some graduate studies in 
24 criminal justice at Long Island University. 
25 A. Yes, sir. 
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1 Q. 
2 A. 
Was that through your employment with the FBI? 
Well, it was while I was employed at the FBI. 
3 wasn't through the FBI. I did that on my own. 
4 Q. You were taking just part-time coursework? 
5 A. Yes, sir. 
6 Q. But you didn't get a degree; is that correct? 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 Q. It indicates that in 1989 to 1990 you had 
9 additional graduate studies at the University of 
10 Virginia. 
11 A. 
12 Q. 
13 A. 
Yes, sir. 
In what area of interest was that? 
That was primarily in adult education. When I 
It 
14 was transferred to the FBI Academy, they wanted all the 
15 staff members to have completed graduate-level courses 
16 in adult education because we teach adults a lot and 
17 adults learn differently than nonadults, so it was a 
18 requirement there at the academy that everyone complete 
19 the courses in adult education. 
20 Q. You list here a Master of Arts in Psychological 
21 Services at Marymount University, Arlington, Virginia, 
22 1992. 
23 Did you actually get a Master of Arts degree? 
24 A. 
25 Q. 
Yes. 
But I asked you earlier if you had any 
12 
postundergraduate degrees, and you said no. 
A. That's a graduate degree. It's a Master's 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
degree. I consider that a graduate degree and not an 
undergraduate degree. 
Q. Maybe you misunderstood the question. 
A. Undergraduate degree. 
7 Q. I said postundergraduate. That's what I thought 
8 I asked you. 
9 A. I misunderstood. You asked me if I had any 
10 
11 
12 
others. 
Q. What is a Master of Arts in Psychological 
Services? 
13 A. It's a degree in -- basically a Master's in 
14 psychology. What made this a little different than 
15 most is that most of the folks who complete that course 
16 are interested in therapy and clinical work. I was 
17 not. I explained that when I applied to go to school 
18 there, and rather than doing internships in therapy and 
19 clinical work, they allowed me to do independent 
20 projects on violence and the psychopathology of 
21 violence which is my interest. 
22 Instead of doing the typical therapy or clinical 
23 work or internships and that sort of thing, they 
24 designed courses where I could do independent study in 
25 the psychopathology of violence, so it was a 
-1 concentration in that area. 
2 Q. 
3 A. 
4 Q. 
You are not a psychologist; is that correct? 
That's correct. 
You are not licensed to do clinical or 
5 therapeutic work; is that correct? 
6 A. That's correct. 
7 
8 
Q. You are not a forensic psychologist; 
correct? 
I'm not any kind of a psychologist. 
is that 
13 
9 A. 
10 Q. The Master's of Psychological Services leads to 
11 what qualifications in terms of a professional 
12 application? 
13 A. Well, a lot of those folks go out and work in 
14 mental health facilities. If they are going to 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
practice, they have to practice generally under the 
wing of a Ph.D. and so forth if they are going to 
practice in clinical practice or therapy. Some go into 
prisons. A lot of the prison psychologists and a lot 
of people with the Master's degree work in that area 
but, again, typically under the wing of a Ph.D. 
Q. Have you missed anything regarding the extent of 
your formal academic education? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You were employed by the FBI from 1969 to 1994; 
is that correct? 
--
Did I personally conduct? 
Yes. 
19 
1 A. 
2 Q. 
3 A. I don't understand what you mean by personally. 
4 That I was personally involved in investigating? 
5 Q. 
6 A. 
Yes. 
A number of homicide investigations. I couldn't 
7 give you a number. 
8 Q. How many domestic homicide investigations did you 
9 personally conduct? 
10 A. Well, there would be no federal violation. I 
11 would have been conducting them as support to local law 
12 enforcement when they asked assistance. 
13 Q. So you have never actually conducted a domestic 
14 homicide investigation; is that correct? 
15 A. I never had a domestic homicide investigation 
16 assigned to me because they are typically not a federal 
17 violation. 
18 Q. So your answer is no? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. So tell me what the behavioral science unit of 
21 the FBI does? 
22 A. It is a behavioral science oriented unit designed 
23 to consolidate research and operational support; 
24 research, training and operational support to any law 
25 enforcement agency that is confronted with unusual or 
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1 A. That's part of it, yes. 
2 Q. 
3 it is 
In crime and crime scene analysis in your opinion 
appropriate to identify a perpetrator? 
4 A. If the evidence allows that. 
5 Q. Have you ever testified in court regarding a 
6 crime scene analysis? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. How many times? 
9 A. A number of times in court; 30 times, 40 times, 
10 something like that. 
11 Q. 
12 A. 
13 Q. 
14 A. 
Any domestic homicides? 
Sure. 
What did you testify to? 
It was a domestic homicide. It was a staged 
15 domestic homicide. 
16 Q. 
17 A. 
Do you recall the name of the case? 
I'd have to go back and look. There was one in 
18 Georgia that jumps out. I've testified to a staging on 
19 a number of cases. I have testified in some domestic 
20 homicide cases. I'm drawing a blank. One in Georgia 
21 which, again, I forget the name. 
22 Q. 
23 A. 
Do you remember the name of the defendant? 
Hang on, it will come to me. It begins with an 
24 N, I think. 
25 MR. MASON: Why don't we 
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1 just provide it for you? 
2 A. 
3 Q. 
I can come up with that if you give me a chance. 
In those cases you testified on staging, right? 
4 
5 
6 
7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you permitted to testify as to who you 
thought committed the crime? 
MR. MASON: Objection. 
8 A. I did not do it in the presence of the jury. I 
9 had been asked to off er opinions outside the presence 
10 of the jury, but not in the presence of the jury. 
11 Those are in criminal cases I might add. 
12 Q. And those cases were in connection with your 
13 position as an FBI agent; is that correct? 
14 A. 
15 Q. 
16 A. 
17 Q. 
Yes, sir. 
In criminal cases? 
Yes. 
You don't have a list of the cases that you 
18 testified in, do you? 
19 A. No, I don't. I've got some of the civil cases I 
20 have testified in recently, but not a whole list of 
21 every case I have ever testified in. 
22 Q. In your CV you indicated the various operational 
23 support of major investigations that you were involved 
24 in? 
25 A. Yes, sir. 
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1 Q. Is that an exhaustive list of all the major cases 
2 
3 
4 
5 
you were involved in? 
A. No, sir, not all the cases. 
Q. Is there any particular reason you put certain 
cases in and not others? 
6 A. These are cases which many times involved task 
7 force investigations that were complex investigations; 
8 many times they were multiple victims, many times they 
9 were serial crimes, serial rape investigations or were 
10 high profile cases for one reason or another. 
11 Q. Getting back to your specialized training, in 
12 your CV I don't see any training whatsoever in the 
13 
14 
15 
16 
field of domestic violence or homicides, is that 
correct, that you never had any specialized training in 
that area? 
A. No, sir. 
17 Q. Tell me where you have had that. 
18 A. It's in the criminal investigative analysis, in 
19 the profile coordinator training. We do all sorts of 
20 homicides, everything from sexual homicides to 
21 drug-related homicides to domestic homicides, 
22 gang-related homicides. All of that is included. 
23 Q. Under what training in your CV would that be 
24 under? 
25 A. Profile/NCAVC Coordinator, 1985; Advanced 
30 
1 Profile/NCAVC Coordinator, 1987; the Advanced 
2 Investigative Crime Seminar in 1982; the in-house 
3 training I did at the bureau when I came down into the 
4 behavioral science unit from '88. 
5 Q. Have you published anything? 
6 
7 
8 
A. I was contributing author to the Crime 
Classification Manual. I have also coauthored an 
article on stalking. 
9 Q. Where is that? Is that listed in your CV? 
10 A. Certainly, yes, listed under publications, "A 
11 Typology of Interpersonal Stalking", I believe is the 
12 title of that. 
13 Q. Maybe it's in the new one? 
14 A. It should be in the old one under publications, 
15 page 9. 
16 Q. 
17 A. 
18 Q. 
Is that the only article you ever published? 
Yes, sir. 
You are not listed as an author of the Crime 
19 Classification Manual; is that correct? 
20 A. Those are the editors that are listed on the 
21 cover. 
22 Q. What was your role? 
23 A. 
24 Q. 
25 A. 
A contributing author to that. 
What section did you write? 
I contributed to all those sections. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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Sometimes we would hand write things in and sit 
in meetings and say, here are the characteristics for 
sexual homicide or whatever. We would go over them and 
some were redundant, some were different, and we would 
refine those and then have the secretary write that 
up. Then we would submit that from the committee to 
the editors and so forth. That's how it worked. 
Q. But you were not in the same category as the 
people I mentioned in terms of their role in this case, 
correct? 
11 A. 
12 Q. 
13 A. 
14 Q. 
15 A. 
They were the editors. 
Have you done any research? 
Yeah, lots of research. 
Where is the research located? 
Well, it's part of the body of the research that 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the FBI has done. 
Q. Have you personally conducted any research where 
the findings have been published? 
A. Well, it would be in conjunction with a lot of 
the research that has been published by the FBI. They 
don't identify the agents by name necessarily. 
Q. My question is, have you conducted any research 
yourself that has been peer reviewed and published? 
A. Under my name? 
Q. Yes. 
--
1 A. 
2 Q. 
No. 
In the Crime Classification Manual there are 
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3 obviously a number of people that were consulted from 
4 different specialties; is that correct? 
5 A. Yes, sir. 
6 Q. Do you have any forensic training? 
7 A. Well, lot's of forensic training. 
8 Q. What forensic training have you had? 
9 A. All of that from new agent training in 1969 
10 through in-service training through some of the other 
11 courses that I have listed there. 
12 Q. Do you have any training or are you an expert in 
13 bloodstain pattern analysis? 
14 A. 
15 Q. 
16 A. 
No. 
Are you an expert in medical issues? 
I'm not a medical expert. Again, if you look at 
17 that you'll see I've been, for example, to the Armed 
18 Forces Institute of Pathology. I've completed courses 
19 in basic and advanced basic forensic pathology. I 
20 don't consider myself to be a forensic pathologist. On 
21 the other hand, I think I have an understanding of some 
22 of these issues. 
23 Q. I understand. But you are not considered to be a 
24 forensic specialist in any area, are you? 
25 A. Depends on what you mean by forensic specialist. 
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1 Q. Are you a member of any forensic association or 
2 organization? 
3 A. If you look at the list of memberships, you'll 
4 see. I think it's on page 9 as well. 
5 Q. Are you a member of the American Academy of 
6 Forensic Sciences? 
7 A. No. I've lectured there. 
8 Q. What is behavioral criminology? 
9 A. Other than my company, you mean other than that? 
10 Q. Is there a field called behavioral criminology? 
11 A. I don't know that there is a field specifically 
12 named that. Certainly I named my company that to try 
13 and distinguish this from other sorts of academic 
14 criminology as well because we consider behavioral 
15 issues in the criminal investigative analysis process 
16 as well as forensic issues. 
17 Q. This is a name you came up with, is that correct, 
18 for your company? 
19 A. 
20 Q. 
Sure. 
There is no recognized field called behavioral 
21 criminology; is that correct? 
22 A. Not that I'm aware of. 
23 Q. There is a field called criminology? 
24 A. Certainly. 
25 Q. What is criminology? 
--
1 A. 
2 Q. 
3 A. 
4 Q. 
5 A. 
It's a study of crime. 
Are you a criminologist? 
Yes. 
Are you licensed as a criminologist? 
I don't think any criminologist is licensed. 
6 a member of the American Society of Criminology, the 
7 British Society of Criminology. 
I understand you're a member of those groups. 
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I'm 
8 Q. 
9 Are there degrees in criminology that one can get 
10 at universities? 
11 A. 
12 Q. 
13 A. 
You can get academic degrees. 
You don't have an academic degree in criminology? 
No, sir. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Q. Doesn't criminology primarily dealing with the 
collection and interpretation of crime-related 
statistics? 
A. Some criminology is. There are all sorts of 
different subfields of criminology. The academic 
criminologists a lot of times just sit there and crunch 
20 stats and numbers. There are other issues with 
21 
22 
23 
criminology. It's a broad field. It deals with all 
the relationships of crimes, criminals, causes of 
crimes. It's a wide field with many subspecialties. 
24 Q. 
25 A. 
You are not a sociologist; is that correct? 
No. 
--
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1 Q. 
2 A. 
You have never had any training in sociology? 
Sure. There is sociology that goes into some of 
3 the psychology courses with social psychology, and 
4 you're dealing with social psychological issues. 
5 Q. There are degrees and licenses in sociology; is 
6 that correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. You don't have any of those? 
9 A. That's correct. 
10 Q. Now, this concept called crime scene criminal 
11 investigative analysis, you recognize that as a 
12 scientific discipline? 
13 A. It's a social science. 
14 Q. Where is that field recognized? 
15 A. In law enforcement and investigations. 
16 Q. Is it recognized by any forensic associations? 
17 A. Well, the courses I took, the workshops I took 
18 are accredited by the American Psychological 
19 Association. I guess they feel it's credible. 
20 Q. 
21 A. 
22 Q. 
Is it a listed field in forensic science? 
It's not a forensic science, no. 
Well, you're testifying about your analyses in 
23 court, correct? 
24 A. 
25 Q. 
Yes. 
Forensic means what? 
·-
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1 Q. There was an article, I'll let you look at it, by 
2 the Mercury News staff, April 5th, 1996 where you were 
3 quoted, and I'll let you look at it if you want. 
4 Gregg Mccrary, a former FBI agent who developed 
5 personality profiles of serial killers in the agency's 
6 behavioral sciences unit, said the one developed for 
7 the Unabomber pretty accurately described Kaczynski as 
8 a loner, an underachiever and extremely intelligent. 
9 You were quoted as saying, we tend to be 80 percent 
10 accurate in the profiles. Mccrary said, then you 
11 quote, this is far from a hard science and the purpose 
12 is to screen potential suspects. 
13 A. I don't disagree with anything. 
14 Q. 
15 A. 
16 Q. 
17 A. 
18 Q. 
19 A. 
20 Q. 
This is not a hard science, correct? 
It's a social science. 
What you do is not a hard science? 
Of course not. 
Mistakes are made? 
Mistakes are made in hard science, too. 
Let's continue on. 
21 A. The question with the Unabomber case was whether 
22 the guy had a Ph.D., and I think the profile said 
23 everything but the Ph.D. 
24 Q. 
25 A. 
And it turned out he did have a Ph.D.? 
I think it was close, but not quite there. 
;.i/lfllll> 
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1 A. The other part is the databases on robbery 
2 homicides and sexual homicides, and we also depend upon 
3 the academic literature as well. 
4 Q. Can you tell me what the uniform crime reporting 
5 system says? What kind of data does that system have? 
6 A. It has data that is reported by police 
7 departments as to the number and types of homicides, 
8 offenders, victim relationship, type of weapon used. 
9 There is all sorts of data that's collected in the 
10 course of that, in the course of compiling the 
11 statistics. 
12 Q. Do you know in terms of if there are any studies 
13 that have been done on the staging of domestic 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
homicides? 
A. Staged domestic homicides per se but academic? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't remember. There is a bunch of literature 
on staged domestic homicides that's out there. 
Q. Do you know if there has been any kind of 
statistical studies of domestic homicides and the 
breakdown in terms of staging or nonstaging? 
22 A. I don't know if it's broken down that way 
23 exactly. 
24 Q. 
25 A. 
Any empirical studies? 
There is lots of research on domestic homicides 
.,,,,.,,. 
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1 and how to respond both in the academic community, in 
2 the therapeutic community, and to a degree I'm assuming 
3 the law enforcement community, and that has shaped how 
4 police are responding to crimes and handling them. 
5 Like stalking and other issues that have come into play 
6 with domestic violence, that's all being researched and 
7 studied and is changing the face of law enforcement 
8 even as we speak. 
9 Q. Can you site any studies that deal with staged 
10 domestic homicide? 
11 A. 
12 Q. 
13 A. 
Off the top of my head, I can't. 
Do you recall seeing anything? 
I don't know. 
It's certainly mentioned in all the homicide 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
literature. In Vern Geberth's book, for example, 
Practical Homicide Investigation, at the very beginning 
it talks about staged homicides and how homicide 
investigators have to be sensitive to stagings. 
There is a new book, Death Investigator's 
Handbook, where they talk about investigating and the 
use of criminal analysis. It's the sort of thing that 
homicide investigators deal with on a daily basis, and 
it's fundamental to the approach of any investigator. 
Q. Would you agree that what you do in terms of 
criminal investigative analysis is only as good as the 
investigation being conducted by the police 
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1 involved? 
2 A. 
3 Q. 
He may have had. 
So here we have two former members of the 
4 behavioral science unit who did similar kinds of work 
5 in that unit, correct? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Similar training, similar experience, correct? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. Coming up with two totally different opinions? 
10 A. I wouldn't say totally different. I think John 
11 is saying it's someone close to the family and has 
12 intimate knowledge, or he's leaning away from the 
13 stranger intruder as we both do. He's saying that John 
14 didn't have anything to do with it. I think initially 
15 he said both, but I think he's saying now that John 
16 Ramsey had nothing to do with it. 
17 As I have said publicly about that job, he may 
18 have access to material I haven't, he may know 
19 something I don't know, but based on what I know, and I 
20 have no inside information in this case, my opinion is 
21 what it was, but it may change if I had additional 
22 information. 
23 Q. This difference of opinion would lend support to 
24 the notion that this was not an exact science, correct? 
25 A. Well, I have always said it's not. 
